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Abstract. Hennessy and Milner have shown that observational equivalence can be characterized 
by a modal language. We show here that a subset of this language, without an explicit negation 
operator, also characterizes it. Using this subset we offer sound and complete modal proof systems 
for simple nondeterministic languages of processes. In the case where observational equivalence 
is not a congruence we show that the observational congruence can also be characterized modally. 
Using this new language we again offer a sound and complete proof system. We briefly comment 
upon proof systems for extensions of the nondeterministic process languages. 
Introduction 
The meaning of a nondeterministic and concurrent program cannot be given 
simply as a function from input to output because the program may interact or 
communicate repeatedly with its environment. In [8], an alternative is proposed 
based on the idea of an observer attempting to communicate or experiment with a 
program. The authors define observational equivalence between two programs in 
terms of indistinguishability b observers. They then offer a family of simple 
languages of processes expressing finite behaviours. For some of these languages 
observational equivalence is not a congruence: program contexts do not preserve 
the equivalence. So the authors define observational congruence as the largest 
congruence contained in the observational equivalence and show that it can be 
axiomatized algebraically. 
Hennessy and Milner show that observational equivalence can be characterized 
by a modal language. (More general modal characterization results are contained 
in [2, I0, 12].) Here we show that a subset of this language, without an explicit 
negation operator, also characterizes it. Using this language we offer sound and 
complete modal proof systems for simple nondeterministic languages of processes. 
In the case where observational equivalence is not a congruence we show that the 
observational congruence can also be characterized modally. Using this new 
language we again offer a complete and sound proof system. We briefly comment 
upon proof systems for extensions of the nondeterministic languages. This, we 
believe, is a tentative first step towards a modal proof theory for Milner's Calculus 
of Communicating Systems [I 1, 13]. 
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The paper consists of six sections. Proofs of the lemmas and theorems are 
contained in Appendix A. Section 1 recalls the definition of observational 
equivalence and Section 2 its modal characterization. In Section 3 we show that a 
sublanguage of this modal language also characterizes the equivalence. Using this 
language which we call L we offer in Section 4 a sound and complete proof system 
NL for a simple nondeterministic language of processes. For this process language 
observational equivalence is a congruence. The addition of unobservable actions to 
it changes this. So in Section 5 we show that an extension of L, L', characterizes 
the congruence. We also offer two sound and complete modal proof systems: UNL 
on L and UNL '  on L'. Finally, in Section 6 we remark upon proof systems for 
extensions of the nondeterministic process languages. 
1. Observational equivalence 
A nondeterministic and concurrent program may communicate repeatedly with 
its environment. Therefore, the meaning of such a program cannot be given simply 
as an input/output function. In [8] the authors propose an alternative based upon 
an idea of observational indistinguishability. Let P be a set of processes and E a 
set of atomic experiments. An atomic experiment on p ~ P is to be understood as 
an attempt to communicate with p. Communication may change a process depending 
upon its internal structure. Hennessy and Milner capture the effect of an experiment 
using a binary relation over P: for each e ~ E, let Re ___ P x P. Using these atomic 
experiments a sequence of equivalence relations Sn over P is defined: 
pSoq if p, qeP,  
p Sn+l q if (i) Ve ~ E Vp': (/9, p') ~ Re implies : lq':  (q, q') ~ Re and p' Sn q', 
(ii) Ve ~ E Vq' : (q, q')~ Re implies 3p' : (p, p')~ Re andp '  S, q'. 
Then p is said to be observationally equivalent to q, written as p S q, whenever p Sn q 
for every n. 
A computation can be considered as a sequence of experiments. Clearly, for two 
processes to be observationally equivalent sameness of computations i  not enough. 
Observational equivalence imposes strong connections between their respective 
intermediate states. Such connections are, in general, needed for comparing the 
behaviours of concurrent programs. 
2. A modal characterization of observational equivalence 
Hennessy and Milner define a modal language which characterizes observational 
equivalence assuming that each Re is image finite: the set {q: (p,q) ~ Re} is finite for 
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each p ~ P and e c E [8]. Let the language J be the least set such that: 
true ~ J, 
-TA, (e)A ~ J whenever A e J and e ~ E, 
A ^ B ~ J whenever A, B ~ J. 
The authors define a satisfaction relation ~j ~ P x J  as the least relation such that: 
p~j t rue  Vp~P,  
p~jA^B if[ p~jAandp~jB ,  
p~j -TA  iff p~iA ,  
p ~j (e)A iff =lp':(p,p')~ Re andp'  ~ jA .  
true stands for true which every process satisfies, p ~ I  (e)true means that an 
e-experiment can be carried out successfully on p. More generally, p ~1 (e)A means 
that p can evolve under some e-experiment to a process atisfying A. Let [e] be the 
dual of (e), [el =-7(e)7,  then p ~j [e]A means that every process which is the 
result of a successful e-experiment on p satisfies A. In particular, because no process 
can satisfy -Ttrue, p ~ j  [e]-7true means that p is e-deadlocked: no e-experiment on 
p can be successful. 
Let J(p)= {A'p ~jA}. Hennessy and Milner prove the following theorem. 
Theorem 2.1. I f  each Re is image finite, then J (p ) -  J(q) iffp S q. 
The proof of this theorem uses modal degree: the modal degree of a formula is 
the maximum depth of modal operators occurring in it. Let J ,  be the sublanguage 
of J containing formulas whose modal degree is at most n. Then the authors show 
that J , (p)=J , (q) i f fpS,  q. The assumption that each Re be image finite can be 
discarded if infinite conjunctions are allowed [10, 12]. 
3. A further modal characterization of observational equivalence 
In this section we offer a subset of J which also characterizes observational 
equivalence. The subset dispenses with an explicit negation operator: this consider- 
ably aids the development of the modal proof theories provided in the sequel. 
Let L be the language which is the least set such that: 
true, false ~ L, 
A^B,  AvB~L wheneverA, BeL ,  
(e)A, [e]AeL wheneverA~Lande~E. 
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The satisfaction relation ~L is similar to ~ j :  
P~Ltrue VpEP, 
p I~ L false Vp E P, 
p~LAAB iff p~LAandp~LB,  
p~LAvB iff p~LAorp~LB,  
p~L(e)A  iff =lp':(p,p)~Reandp'~LA, 
p ~L[e]A iff Vp':(p,p')sReimpl iesp'~LA. 
L is a sublanguage of J where false is defined as -atrue, A v B as -a(-1A A -aB) 
and [e]A as before. L characterizes observational equivalence because L_  J and 
every formula of J is semantically equivalent to some formula of L: where A, B are 
formulas then A is semantically equivalent to B, which we write as A-= B, just in 
case Vp s P: p ~ A iff p ~ B; the satisfaction relations in this definition will be 
relativized to whatever languages A and B belong to. This semantic relationship 
holds between J and L because negations can be 'moved inwards' in any formula 
of J using the equivalences -atrue-- false, -a -~A-  ,4, -a(A A B) = -aA v -aB, and 
-a(e)A = [e]-aA. Consequently, the following theorem holds. 
Theorem 3.1. VA ~ J, =1B ~ L: A --- B. 
An almost immediate corollary of this theorem given that L_  J and that J 
characterizes observational equivalence is that L also characterizes it.
Corollary 3.2. I f  each Re is image finite, then L(p)= L(q) iff p S q. 
We could have gone further here and defined the set of modal conjunctive normal 
forms (or disjunctive normal forms) as a sublanguage of L and shown that every 
formula of J i(semantically equivalent to a normal form formula. (The additional 
equivalences (e)(A v B) =- (e)A v (e)B and [e](A A B) =-- [e]A A [e]B are needed to 
show this.) However, the notion of modal normal form here, unlike the language 
L, is not very perspicuous. 
4. A complete modal proof theory for a simple nondeterministic language 
In this section we offer a complete (and sound) modal proof theory for a simple 
nondeterministic language of processes (a small subset of CCS [11, 13]). Let E, the 
/ 
set of atomic experiments, be a set of unary atomic action operators, NIL be a 
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nullary operator and + a nondeterministic dyadic operator. The set of processes 
NP is the least set such that 
NIL  ~ NP, 
e.p ~ NP whenever e~ E, 
p + q ~ NP whenever p, q ~ NP. 
This little language is intended to capture when a process p can evolve to another 
process by performing an action in E: the idea is, for example, that e.q becomes q 
by performing e. This performing of actions is defined using a labelled transition 




p + q ~ p' whenever p ~ p', 
e e 
p + q ~ q' whenever q ---) q'. 
The notion of performing an action here is the correlate of being experimented 
on: p evolves to q by performing e (p--~ q) in response to an e-experiment. If p 
cannot perform e then p cannot respond to an e-experiment: for instance, NIL, the 
process which cannot do anything, is unable to respond to any experiment in E. 
Consequently, the nondeterminism captured by + may be controlled by an observer 
(experimenter): for example, e.p+b.q becomes p in response to an e-experiment, 
and q in response to a b-experiment. On the other hand, this is not true of e.p+ e.q: 
an observer has no control as to whether p or q results in response to an 
e-experiment. 
Two processes, p and q e NP, are said to be equivalent, written as p - q, just in 
case they are observationally equivalent. (Alternative quivalences based on experi- 
ments are proposed in [3,5, 7, 9, 14].) The equivalence - is a congruence: this result 
is proved in [8] where it is algebraically axiomatized. Clearly, for any e, -~ is image 
finite. Hence, by Corol lary 3.2 we know that L characterizes - : two processes in 
NP are observationally distinguishable iff they are modally distinguishable. For 
instance, p = e.(a.p'+ b.q') satisfies [e](a)true whereas q = e.a.p'+ e.b.q' does not. 
We now offer a sound and complete modal proof  theory NL defined on L for 
the language of processes NP. We use a proof-theoretic relation ~NL between 
processes and formulas: p ~--NL A means that A ~ L is provable of p ~ NP. The index 
NL is suppressed for the most part. Some of the following rules are analogous to 
Gentzen's introduction rules [4]: here, however, two very different kinds of objects 
are elements of either side of  ~-. 
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The system NL 
true p ~- true, 
Nil NILt-[e]A,  
Act e.q~-[a]A whenever e ~ a, 
p~-A p~B 
VX p~-A v B p~-A v B' 
p~-A pF-B 










[e ]+I  
p+q~[e]A 
The rules of NL are straightforward. NIL~-[e]A because NIL cannot perform 
any action in E. Similarly, e.qt--[a]A whenever a ~ e because .q can only perform 
e. This also accounts for the (e)l and [ell rules. The V!  and A I  rules are as 
expected. The final two clauses of the labelled transition relation above account for 
the (e)+ I rules: i fp  (or q) can evolve to a process which satisfies A by performing 
e then so can p + q. Similarly for [e] + ! which says that if every e-experiment on 
p and on q results in a process satisfying A then likewise for every e-experiment 
on p+q. 
A proof in NL can be represented either as a finite tree, as in standard Gentzen 
proof systems, or as a finite sequence as in axiomatic proof systems. We give two 
example NL proofs: 
a.p + b.q ~- ((a) true A (b)true) A [c ] fa lse  
( a) i p ~- true ( b) I q ~- true 
(a)+ la.Pl-(a) true (b)+ i b.q~(b) true 
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A Ia'p+b'q~-<a)true a.p+b.q~-(b)true [c]
+ ia.P~-[c]false b.q~-[c]false 
/~ I a.p + b.q F- (a)true ^  (b)true a.p + b.q ~ [c]false 
a.p + b.q ~- ((a)true ^  (b)true) ^  [c]false 
a.bNIL+ a.b.c.NIL~- [ a ]( b )[ c ]true 
(i) N IL~[c] t rue Nil ax, 
( i i )  b.NIL~(b)[c]true (b)I, 
(iii) a.b.NILF-[a](b)[c]true [a]I, 
(iv) NILe-true true ax, 
(v) c.NIL~- [c]true [c]I, 
(vi) b.c.NIL~-(b)[c]true (b)I, 
(vii) a.b.c.NIL~[a](b)[c]true [a]/,  
(viii) a.b.NIL+a.b.c.NIL~[a](b)[c]true [a ]+ I on (iii) and (vii). 
The system NL is both sound and complete. This is the content of the following 
theorem. 
Theorem 4.1. p ~LA iffp ~--NL A. 
An obvious corollary is that p ~ q iff NL(p) = NL(q) where NL(p) = {A : p ~-NL A}. 
The system NL does not include a rule of the form 
p~A q~-B 
+I  
p+q~-A , B 
where * is a truth-functional connective on L. If the rule is to  be sound then * 
cannot be truth-functional unless A * B -- true for every A and B. This result, which 
is proved for the more general anguage J, is the content of the next theorem. 
Theorem 4.2. I f  * is any truth-functional dyadic connective on J such that 
3C, D:  C * D ~true, then every rule of the form +I above is unsound. 
Similarly, a more restricted rule of the form 
p~- jA q~- jA 
+ I  
p+q F-jA 
is also unsound: for example, let A be --a((a)truen (b)true), then a.NIL ~ jA  and 
b.NIL ~A but a .NIL+ b.NIL ~ jA .  Here, A is a formula whose content is negative 
in the sense that it says of a process what it cannot do. It is this which causes the 
problems. (It is unlikely that a language which does not express such negative 
information could characterize observational equivalence.) This discussion brings 
out that L is technically simpler for constructing a modal proof system for NP than 
the language J :  there would be no simple -11 rule but instead introduction rules 
for -aA which depend upon the structure of A as evidenced by the NIL, Act, ~/I, 
[e]I and [e ]+ I rules of NL. 
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5. Complete modal proof theories for a nondeterministic language involving 
unobservable actions 
In the case of the nondeterministic language of processes, NP, above every e-action 
is observable. This means that the evolving of one process to another is always 
observable. Suppose an unobservable action, a 'silent' action, r is also included: 
Let E '= E u {~'}. We call the resulting nondeterministic language NP'. There is no  
atomic experiment corresponding to r. The notion of performing an observable 
action, an e-action, is redefined to take account of ~" [8]. Let p z~ q stand for 
::l n >>- O, P l ,  • • •,  pn: P ~ Pl .L.> . . . ._r..> Pn = q; that is, p -~ q means that p can evolve 
to q by performing a finite number of unobservable actions. When n = 0 then p = q. 
Let ~,e  ~ E, be a labelled transition relation on NP' defined as follows: p ~ q iff 
3p ' ,  p" s.t. p z.Z> p, _~ p,, z_Z> q. The new relation ~,  e ~ E, may absorb any finite 
sequence of unobservable actions before and after the action e. Note that ~ is 
image finite in the case of NP'. 
Although there is no experiment corresponding to r its presence in a process can 
affect its observable behaviour. For example, consider p = a.(b.NIL+ z.NIL) and 
q = a.(b.NIL+ NIL) which is like p except for the absence of r: p is observationally 
distinguishable from q because p can evolve to NIL whereas q can only evolve to 
b.NIL+ NIL in response to an a-experiment. Let = be the observational equivalence 
on NP' defined using ~,  e ~ E, to stand for Re of the definition of Section 1 instead 
of -~ as in the case of NP. The equivalence = is not a congruence: program contexts 
do not preserve it. For instance, ~'.NIL ~ NIL but, as just noted, a.(b.NIL+ r.NIL) ¢~ 
a.(b.NIL+ NIL). Let =c be the largest congruence contained in =. This congruence 
is axiomatized algebraically in [8]. 
From the present discussion and Corollary 3"2 we know that the modal language 
L characterizes =. Below, we offer a sound and complete proof system UNL on L 
for NP': We also show that ~c can be characterized by an extension of L which we 
call L'. Furthermore, a sound and complete proof system UNL' on L' is given for NP'. 
The NL rule [e ] I  is not sound for NP': for example, a.NIL+ z.NIL ~L (a)true 
but e.(a.NIL+ ~'.NIL) ~L [e](a)true because .(a.NIL+ r.NIL) ~ NIL. However, it 
appears that a complete proof system for NP' on L should include a [el introduction 
rule to derive valid instances such as e.(a.NIL+ ~'.a.NIL) ~L [e](a)true. In contrast, 
the NL(e) I  rule is no longer sufficient: for example, e . (a .N IL+z .N IL )  ~L(e)  
[a]false could not be derived using it because a.NIL+ 7.NIL ~L [a]false. This means 
that (e) and [e] introduction rules have to be less 'local' than in NL. We achieve 
this by making use of contexts with the result that the proof systems below are less 
elegant han NL. 
Let ~ be the least set o f  contexts on NP' such that 
#e~,  
~-.~b e ~ whenever ~b ~ ~, 
p + q~, ~b + p e ~ whenever ~b e c¢ and p e NP'. 
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When ~b e c¢, ~b(p) stands for the process which is the result of replacing p for # 
in ~b: for instance, if ~b is 7 . (p+#) ,  then ~b(q) is 7.(p+q). The definition of c¢ has 
the following consequence where 7* stands for a f initenpossibly emptynsequence 
of 7 occurrences. 
Lemma 5.1. 7*.e.p ~ q iff q =p or 3c~ e ~ s.t. p = ~b(7.q). 
Note the essential occurrence of 7 in ~b(7.q) in this lemma. An immediate corollary 
is the following. 
Corollary 5.2 
(i) 7*.e.p~L(e)A iff p~LAor3q ,  c/~s.t.p=d~(7.q) 
and q ~ L A 
(ii) 7*.e.p~L[e]A iff p~LAandVq,  c~: ifp=cb(7.q) 
then q ~ r A 
The set {q: 3~b s.t. p = ~b(7.q)} is finite for each p e NP'. It is this corollary which 
justifies the (e)qbI and [e]dpI rules below of UNL  and the [e]dpI rule of UNL'.  
The system UNL 
The true ~// ,  and/~ I rules of UNL  below are as in NL. The Nil, Act, (e)/, (e)+I 
and [e] + I rules are similar to those of NL  except that 7* is prefaced to the process 
in the consequent or axiom. The significant differences to NL are the rules (e)dpI 
and [e]~bI which we justified above. As before we suppress the index UNL.  
true p t-- true, 
Nil 7*.NILe- [e]A, 
Act ~'*.e.qF-[a]A when e# a, 
V I p~-A p~-B 
p~AvB p~-AvB'  
p~-A p~-B 
AI  
p~-AA B ' 
(e ) I  p~A 
7*.e.p~-(e)A' 
(e)cM pF-A 7*.e.~b(7.p)l-(e)A for any context ~b e ~, 
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p~-A, ql~-A,.. . ,  q,~-A 




~'*.(p+q)~-Ce)A .r*.(p+ q)~-Ce)A" 
p~-[e]A ql--[e]A 
[e ]+I  
7*.(p+ q)~[e]A 
An example proof  illustrating the use of the rules (e)¢I and [e]¢I is as follows. 
Let 
r = b .N IL+ ¢.NIL, 
p = a.NIL,  
q = ~-.p + 7-.(~-.p + ~'.~-.a.7".r). 
The set {q :3¢  s.t. q=¢(z.q')}={p,a.~-.r, 1".a.~'.r, .p+~-.z.a.z.r}. We prove that 
~'.e.q t-[ e]C a)[ b ]false. 
(i) NIL~-[b]fa lse Nil ax, 
(ii) r.p~-Ca)[b]false Ca)I on (i), 
(iii) q ~Ca)[b]false Ca)+ I on (ii), 
(iv) p~-(a)[b]false Ca)I on (i), 
(v) 1".p+ r.~'.a.r.r~-Ca)[b]false Ca)+I  on (ii), 
(vi) z.a.'r.r~Ca)[b]false Ca)qbI on (i) (~b is ¢.(b.NIL+ # )), 
(vii) a.z.r~Ca)[b]false Ca)qbI on (i) (¢  is r . (b .NIL+ # )), 
(viii) 1".e.qt-[e]Ca)[b]false [e]¢I on (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), and (vii). 
The system UNL is both sound and complete. 
Theorem 5.3. ~L A iffp ]=='UNL A- 
The language L' 
The equivalence ~c was stipulated to be the largest congruence contained in ~-. 
(Recall that = is not a congruence.) This congruence is more refined than =: for 
instance ~'.NIL~c NIL.  A first suggestion, then for a language which characterizes 
=c instead of ~ is to extend L by the addition of a modal operator Cz) corresponding 
to the unobservable action ~'. This, in effect, allows us to talk directly about the 
silent moves of a process: z.NIL~Cz)true whereas NIL~Cz)true . However, the 
resulting modal language would be too strong if iteration of such an operator is 
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allowed because z.~'.p =c~-.p. Similarly, if it can appear within the scope of the other 
modal operators [e] and (e) because, for instance, e.~-.p =¢e.p. Consequently, we 
add to L a monadic modal operator O which cannot appear within the scope of 
any other modal operator including itself. Let L' be the resulting modal anguage. 
OOA, (e)((b)trueA O true) are not formulas of L' whereas O true and (e)truev 
O (e)true are. The satisfaction relation for L' is as before except for the additional 
clause where ~ is like ~:  
P ~c, OA iff 3p's . t .p~p'andp '~L,A .  
The following theorem shows that L' characterizes =~. 
Theorem 5.4. p ~-cq iff L'(p)= L'(q). 
Note that this result unlike the characterization results of Sections 2 and 3 is 
process language dependent: it may fail to hold if additional operators are added 
to NP'. The process ~-.p will, in general, be distinguishable from p by a formula of 
the form OA: for example, ~'.NIL ~,  O true whereas NIL t:L, O true. 
The system UNL'  
We now offer a complete proof system UNL' on L'. The additional operator O 
allows us to dispense with the (e)dpI rule (of UNL) but not with the [e]dpI. (The 
latter rule is dispensable if the dual of O is also included as an operator.) We adopt 
the following convention: if A e L', then A* ~ L is the formula which results from 
removing all occurrences of O in A. 
true, Nil, Act, V / , /~ / ,  (e)+/ ,  and [e ]+I  rules as in UNL, 
p~A 
(e)I 
~'*.e.p ~- (e)A*" 
p~-A, q l t -A , . . . ,  q,,t-A 
[e]d~I ~'*.e.p~[e]A* where {q~,. . . ,  q,} = {q: 3d~.p = d~(z.q)}, 
p~-A 




The following is a derived rule of UNL' for any A e L and d~ e ~: 
~-A 
d~IP~( ~'.p) I-- OA " 
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It follows straightforwardly from OI  and O+L Thus, the (e)~bI is derivable by 
application of (e) I  to the consequent of ~bL An example proof e. (a .N IL+ 
r.b.NIL) b(e)[a]fa lse illustrates that (e )$ I  is derivable in UNL': 
(i) b .NIL~ [a]false Act, 
(ii) z.b.NILI-- O[a]false 0I ,  
(iii) a .N IL+' r .b .N IL~O[a] fa l se  O+}, 
(iv) e.(a.NIL+~'.b.NIL)~{e)[a]false (e)I. 
The system UNL' is both sound and complete. 
Theorem 5.5. p ~ L' A iff  p ~-UNL' A. 
6. Concluding remarks: Proof systems for richer process languages 
We have shown that complete proof systems can be given for non-deterministic 
languages of processes. Completeness is,here, relative to observational equivalence 
or congruence. However, the languages of processes involved are not very rich. 
Following [8] a binary parallel operator I may be added to the nondetermistic 
process language. I is chosen to represent the combination of a pair of programs 
which may proceed concurrently and also communicate with each other. To express 
communication let/7 be a set of (observable) actions disjoint from E but in bijection 
with it. The bijection and its inverse are represented by -. Thus, ~ ~/~ and e= e 
whenever e~ E. Communication between two processes may occur when one admits 
an e-experiment and the other an ~-experiment: the resulting communication is 
represented by a z-action. (Internal communication is therefore treated as unobserv- 
able.) The labelled transition relation for [ is as follows where e ~ E u/~ w {~'}: 
pl q "~ p'l q whenever p ~ p', 
Pl q "~ Pl q' whenever e-~ q', 
p l q ~ p'l q' whenever p -~ p' and q ~ q'. 
Defining the experiment relations {~"  e c E w/~} as in the previous ection gives 
rise to an observational equivalence = '  and a congruence -c.-' As before, these are 
different. Clearly, the modal anguage L characterizes --'. It appears that L' character- 
izes ='c. Unfortunately, we have not discovered a natural proof system for this 
language of processes which has ] introduction rules. However, Hennessy and Milner 
show that [ can be eliminated from any process in this language using the follow- 
ing expansion theorem where ~l<-i<-n ei.p~ = el.p~ +.  • • + e,.pn if n > 0 and NIL 
otherwise [8]. 
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Theorem 6.1. I f  p is ~i ei.p~ and q is ~j aj.qj, then 
p lq~"  Y~ e,.(p, lq)+Y~ aj.(plqj)+ Y~ z.(p, lq~). 
i j e i=a j
Thus, we may add to our proof system UNL' the following rule: 
p~-A 
I.qi-r--~a wheneverp.~'q[r by Theorem 6.1. 
This, of course, is not a very satisfactory proof rule. Firstly, it is very indirect. And 
secondly, the elimination of[ goes through because ach process represents a finite 
behaviour. 
An alternative suggestion for dealing with [ (loosely based on [1]) is to introduce 
a relativized satisfaction relation ~A where A is a formula. The intended meaning 
of p ~A B is: 
Vq: q ~ A implies qlp ~ B. 
Thus, A in ~A represents, in some sense, an environment. Moreover, because I is 
associative p ~A B and q ~n C imply plq ~A C. 
This means that we need to offer proof rules for a relativized proof-theoretic 
consequence relation p~AB.  Of interest is that rules for I introduction will be 
analogous to Gentzen's cut rule [ G]: 
q~ A p~-AB 
qlp~_ B ' 
q~AB p~-BC 
q[p~-A C 
A further extension to the language of processes i to add a facility for potentially 
infinite behaviours. In CCS this is achieved by the addition o f  process variables 
and a fix operator [11, 13]. Let X range over a set of process variables which are 
nullary operators. Also added is fix X, a monadic binding operator: in fix X.p all 
free occurrences of X in p are bound by fix X. The labelled transition rule for fix is: 
fix X.p --% p' wheneverp[fix X.p/ X] --% p' 
where [-/-] denotes the usual notion of substitution. It is hoped that the addition 
of the following proof rule to the systems in the previous ections result in complete 
proof systems: 
p[fix X.p/X] ~ A 
fix I 
fix X.p ~ A 
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Appendix A 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We suppress the indices on the satisfaction and proof relation. 
[~]  Soundness. We show that the theorem holds for the axioms and is preserved 
by the rules. 
true ax Clear because p ~ true. 
Nil ax Vp, e: (NIL, p)~ Re. 
Hence N IL~ [e]A. 
Actax Ifp=e.q, thenVr, a: a~e~(p ,  r)~Ra. 
Hence p ~ [a]A when a ~ e. 
V I Suppose p ~ A; then clearly p ~ A v B. 
Similarly, if p ~ B, then p ~ A v B. 
A I Suppose p ~ A and p ~ B; then p ~ A A B. 
(e)I Suppose p ~ A; then clearly e.p ~ (e)A. 
[ e] I Suppose p ~ A; then clearly e.p ~ [ e]A. 
(e)+I Suppose p~(e)A; then3p' : (p ,p ' )~Reandp'~A.  
By the + rule, i fp -~p' ,  then p + q-~, p'. 
Hence, p + q ~ (e)A. 
Similarly if q ~ (e)A. 
[e ]+I  Supposep~[e]A and q~[e]A. 
Then Vp' : (p, p')e Re~p'~ A. 
and Vq': (q, q')e Re~q'~ A. 
Hence Vr: (p + q, r) ~ Re ~ r ~ A. 
So p+ q~ [e]A. 
[3 ]  Completeness. Induction on n (is the number of connectives in A). 
Basis step (n = 0): A = true. Clearly holds by the true axiom and because p ~ false. 
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Induction step (n = k+ 1)i' Case (A = B v C): p~A iff p~ B or p~ C. Suppose 
p ~ B then by induction hypothesis p ~ B. By V I, p ~- B v C. Similarly if p ~ C. 
Case (A= B A C): p~A iff p~B and p~ C. By induction hypothesis p~-B and 
p ~- C. Hence p ~- B A C by/~ I. 
Case (A = (e)B): Induction on structure of p. 
Subcase (p = NIL): Impossible for p~ A. 
Subcase (p=b.q): Then b=e, otherwise p~ A. Hence, q~ B. By induction 
hypothesis, q~ B. By (e)I rule, e.qF-(e)B. 
Subcase (p = q+ r): Then q~(e)B or r~(e)B. Suppose q~(e)B. By induction 
hypothesis q~(e)B. By rule (e)+/ ,  p~(e)B. Similarly if r~ (e)B. 
Case (A = [e]B): Induction on structure of p. 
Subcase (p = NIL): By Nil ax. pF-[e]B. 
Subcase (p = b.q): I f  b ~ e then pF-[e]B by Act ax. If b = e then q~ B. By 
induction hypothesis qF-B. Hence by [e]I, pF-[e]B. 
Subcase (p=q+r) :  Then q~[e]B and r~[e]B. By induction hypothesis 
q~[e]B and r~[e]B. By [e ]+/ ,  p~[e]B. [] 
Theorem 4.2. I f  A, B ~ J, p, q ~ NP and * is a truth-functional dyadic operation such 






Proof. There are sixteen possible truth-functional dyadic operators. A * B-= true is 
excluded and A * B--  --atrue is clearly unsound. We show that the other fourteen 
cases are excluded by the following examples 
(1) a .N IL~ [b]false. b.NIL~ [a]false. 
(2) a .N IL~ (a)true. b.NIL~ (b)true. 
(3) a .N IL~ (a)true. b .NIL~ [a]faise. 
Cases A * B - A A B, A A ~B, -1A A B, A, B, A v B are excluded by (1). 
Cases A * B -= -aA ^  --aB, -aA, --aB, (A v B) ^  -a(A ^  B), -aA v --aB are excluded by 
(2). 
Cases A * B - ~A v B, A v --3B, (A ^  B) v (-aA ^  ~B)  are excluded by (3). [] 
Lemma 5.1. ~'*.e.p:~q i f fq=p or 3~b~ c£: p=d~(z.q). 
Proof. [3 ]  Consider the possible structure of q by induction on p. 
(i) p = 7"*.NIL: q =p or p = ~-.~'*.q. The result follows by definition of the 
set ~¢. 
(ii) p = z*.a.r: q = p or p = z.z*.q. As before, the result follows. 
(iii) p = z*. (s+ r): q =p orp  = ~'.~'*.q as before. 
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.g../.a~ ./.T~ 
Otherwise, q is s.t. s > q or r , q. Again the result follows by definition 
of cC 
[~]  Suppose q =p;  then clearly r*.e.p#=>p. Otherwise induction on ~b. 
(i) ~b = #.  Then p = z.q. Clearly, ¢*.e.z.q ~ q. 
(ii) d' = ~'.O- Then p = ~'.O(r.q). Again z*.e.z.O(r.q) ~ q by induction hypothesis. 
(iii) ~b=r+6 or0+r .  Suppose ~b=r+~ then p=r+O(¢.q). By induction 
hypothesis ¢*.e.O(r.q)~ q. By rules for + and ==>z*.e.(r+d/(r.q))#=> q. Similarly 
for d~=O+r.  [] 
Theorem 5.3. p ~ L A iff p ~"'UNL A. 
Proof. We suppress indices on both the proof relation and satisfaction relation. The 
proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.1 which we appeal to. 
[~]  Soundness. Clearly, the axioms are sound. The V I and A I rules are sound 
by Theorem 4.1. 
Case ((e)I):  Suppose p ~ A; then clearly z*.e.p ~ (e)A. 
Case ((e)~bI): Suppose p~A.  Then r*.e.q=~p iff q=p or 3c~.q=~b(r.p) by 
Lemma 5.1. Therefore, z*.e.q ~ (e)A. 
Case ([e]~bI): Suppose p~A and ql~A, . . . ,q , ,~A.  Consider the set 
{q': ~'*.e.q:~ q'}. If this set = {p, q l , . . . ,  qn}, then ~'*.e.q~[e]A. 
Case ( (e )+I ) :  Suppose p~(e)A; then 3p': p~p'  and p'~A. By rules for +, if 
p ~p ' ,  then r*.(p+ q)~p ' ,  and the result follows. Similarly for q ~ (e)A. 
Case ( [e ]+I ) :  Suppose p~[e]A and q~[e]A. Then Vp':pf::>p' implies p'~ A 
and Vq': q ~ q' implies q'~A. Thus Vr: r*.(p+q) :~> r implies r~A. The result 
follows. 
[3 ]  Completeness. Induction on n (is the number of connectives in A). The case 
n=0 is as in Theorem 4.1. The subcases A=Bv C, A=BA C of n =k+l  are also 
as in Theorem 4.1. 
Case (A = (e)B): Induction on p. 
Subcase (p= ~-*.NIL): Impossible. 
Subcase (p = r*.b.q): Then b = e. By Corollary 5.2, q~ B or 3r, qb: q = ~b(r.r) A 
r~ B. These cases are covered by the rules (e)I and (e)dpI. 
Subcase (p = r*.(q+ r)): Then q~(e)B or r~(e)B. The result follows by (e)+ I
rules. 
Case (A = [e]B): Induction on p. 
Subcase (p = r*.NIL): By NIL ax, p~[e]B. 
Subcase (p = r*.b.q): I f  b ~ e, then p~-[e]B by Act ax. If b = e, then p~[e]B 
iff q~ B and Vr, dp s.t. q=cb(r.r) implies r~ B. 
The result follows by [e]ckl rule. 
Subcase (p = r*.(q + r)): Then q~ [e]B and r~ [e]B. The result follows by the 
[e ]+I  rule. [] 
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For the proof of Theorem 5.4 we inductively define the modal degree of a formula 
A ~ L', written as m (a): 
m (true)  = m ( fa l se)  = 0, 
m(A ^  B) = m(A v B) =max{m(A), m(B)}, 
m((e)A)= m([e]A)= m( OA)= m(A)+ l. 
We let L" stand for the language {A'Ae L'^ m(A)<~ n}. 
We also define the set of general contexts on NP' as the least set D such that 
(i) CA e D. 
(ii) z.~, e.~ e D whenever ~ ~ D. 
(iii) p+~b, g,+p~D whenever g, ~ D and p ~ NP'. 
Hence we define p ~q as Vg, ~ D" g,(p) = g,(q). 
In the following theorem we make use of induction of the number of 'constructs' 
in 0 which is defined inductively: 
(i) c (#)  =0.  
(ii) c(z.$)=c.(e.¢)=l+c($). 
(iii) c(p+$)=c(¢+p)=2+c($).  
Theorem 5.4. p=~q iff L'(p) = L'(q). 
Proof. It suffices to show that (V0e  D: d/(p)~nO(q)) iff L'(p)= L'(q). 
(1) n = 0: 
~b(p) ~o0(q)  (Vp, q, ~) and p~true (Vp) and p~ false (Vp). 
(2) (V~b~D:d/(p)~,,+l~b(q))~L'+l(p)=L'+l(q): We know that p~,,+lq~ 
L,,+~(p)=L,,+~(q) via Theorem 2.1 and Corollary 3.2. Hence, Vg, eD:  
if(P) ~n+l ~b(q)~ Ln+~(p) = L,,+~(q). 
The only difference between L and L' is the operator O. We have to show that 
if Vff~ D: g'(P) ~n+l if(q) then p~ OA iff q~ OA. 
Suppose p~OA and q[:OA. Then 3p' :p~p'  and p'~A where A~L,,. And 
Vq ' :q~ q' implies q'[:A. Let ~b be e.(b.NIL+#) where b does not occur in p or 
in q. Then g,(p) ~p '  and p'~A and -73s:p'~s. But Vq': ~b(q) ~q '  either q'~A 
or 3r:  q' ~ r. But A ~ L,. Hence q/(p) ¢~,+1 g,(q) which contradicts hypothesis. 
(3) 30:  O(p)¢~,,+~ ~b(q)~L'+~(p) # L',+~(q): Induction on ~b. 
(i) ¢, = CA: The result follows via Theorem 2.1 and Corollary 3.2 because L~ L'. 
(ii) tp = ~-.T: z.T(p) ~,,+~ '.T(q). But this holds iff T(p)~n+~ T(q). 
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(iii) O=e.T: e.T(p)~n+le.T(q). 3p': T (p )~p '  and Vq': T(q)~q '  implies 
P'C~nq'. Prove it by induction on c(T). 
Case (c = O):p ~p '  and Vq': q ~ q'p'C~,,q'. Thus 3A~ L:p~ OA and q~ OA. 
Case ( c = k+ 1): Subcase (T = ~-.O): Follows by induction hypothesis. 
Subcase (T = b.O ) : Clearly e. T( p ) ~n+l e. T( q ) just in case T( p ) ~ ,~ T( q ). By 
main induction hypothesis L'(p) ~ L" (q), hence L'+I (p) ~ L'+I (q). 
Subcase (T=r+l- l ,O+r):  Suppose T=r+O.  Then e.O(p)C~,,+le.O(q) 
(because r won't make a difference) and c(e.O)< C(r+O).  Therefore, the result 
follows. Similarly for T =/2 + r. 
(4) ~b = r+ T, T+ r: Clearly, r+ T(p) ¢~,~+1 r+ T(q) iff T(p) ~,,+~ T(q). The result 
follows by induction hypothesis. Similarly for T(p)+ r. [] 
Theorem 5.5. p ~ L' A iff p ]-"UNL' A. 
Proof. The proof is very close to that of Theorem 5.3 above. 
[~]  Soundness. Soundness of rules except for OI and O + I is almost as in 
Theorem 5.3. 
Case (OI): Suppose p ~ A and A does not contain O; then clearly r*.~-.p ~ OA. 
Case ( O + I): Suppose p ~ 0,4; then 3p' : p ~ p' ^  p' ~ A. Clearly ~'* (p + q) ~ p', 
thus z*(p+ q)~ OA. Similarly, if q~ OA. 
[~]  Completeness. Proof as in Theorem 5.3 except for a new case: 
Case (A= OB): p~A iff 3p':p=~>p' and p'~B, thus, by induction hypothesis, 
p'~-B, and by OI and O+I  rules the result follows. [] 
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